
PRAGUE – GAC/SSR-RT Joint Session
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ICANN - Prague, Czech Republic

CHAIR DRYDEN: Good afternoon, everyone.

Let's begin our session of the GAC with the security, stability, and resiliency review team, who are here to talk about their final report.

And to my right, I have the chair of the review team, Alejandro Pisanty, and he may wish to introduce other colleagues in the review team as well present today. But I understand that you are going to walk us through a presentation related to the report, and then the GAC members may have questions that they would like to ask of you.

So, please, I'll hand over to you.

ALEJANDRO PISANTY: Thank you.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair, Heather.

Thank members of the GAC for opening up this session in your schedule for us.

There are a number of members. My name is Alejandro Pisanty. I am very proud to have served as chair of the Security, Stability, and Resilience of the DNS Review Team and to be able to you to deliver now the final report of that team. I will describe that process in a second.

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There are several members of this review team here in the room. Simon McCalla, who will do part of the presentation; Alice Munyua, who has been the GAC representative; Anders Rafting I think must be around or will arrive soon who was also the GAC member detailed to the review team; Hartmut Glaser; Martin Hannigan; David Cake; and Ondrej Filip. Since they are sitting behind me, I'm not sure if I am picking up every other member.

Is there anyone else I should mention?

And in advance I will say that we are very thankful to ICANN members of staff who were also detailed to support us and who have done a fantastic job and made our work really much easier and smoother.

Prominently, Ms. Alice Jansen, Mr. Olof Nordling; and the ICANN security staff, Patrick Jones, Jeff Moss; and a few others have -- and Denise Michel have been extremely helpful to us. And I'm sure I am missing someone, but believe me, it's not because of lack of thankfulness.

The presentation we have prepared for you is very simple. Basically, what we want to say -- the presentation mostly contains one slide each with our recommendations we made.

We won't walk you through them in detail, but we are open to questions about them.

What we will do is tell you very quickly what we did, what are our most general findings and then be open for questions.

First, we have to remind people that this review team was convened based on the Affirmation of Commitments. This is one. Four review teams that are mandated by the Affirmation of Commitments, and its mandate began October of 2010. We first met in December 2010, so we have basically been a year and a half, 18 months in the project, which seemed -- which was more or less the four seen duration, and we are happy that we made it in that -- in almost exactly really the foreseen time.

The composition, as you know, has representatives from all supporting organizations and advisory committees. It has independent experts. It has a designated nominee of the chair of the GAC and a designated nominee of ICANN's president and CEO.

We have our terms of reference. We divided the work in subteams. At the end we have two functional -- we have two divisions into subteams. For the first few months we have a functional division into, like, rules and policy into implementation and risk management. And after we have the first set of documents ready, we resplit the team into a core drafting team and the rest of the team so that the core drafting team was in charge of everything, managing language from different members, putting together one after another drafts. We got to something like version 23 over the process, which tells you there was an extremely intense, careful work.

Much of this drafting and redrafting was also based on the public consultations we held on the different versions of the draft, and before we had the draft, on the different findings that we were making and calling for input from the community.

Another process characteristic that I would like to put forward, to put before you, is that we decided to do something different than other review teams have done, which was not calling -- we decided not to call on external experts, but mostly to rely on our own expertise. That was a judgment call based on the idea that before -- the time it would take to write the terms of reference for putting out the bid for consultants, putting together a budget and so forth, will be more or less equivalent to the time that we need to do the work ourselves.

The level of penetration of the review is such that we did not need to bring in technical expertise, because this is another important definition that I would beg you to keep in mind.

This review is a review of ICANN's action at the level of -- or with the objective of preserving and enhancing the stability, security, and resilience of the DNS. What it is not is important to define this better.

This is not a technical, information, technology, security review or audit. This is not a technical audit of how security is working in ICANN. This is not an audit looking at whether there is a way to track the most recent vulnerabilities and actually do some penetration testing. It's not that kind of technical work. That will be in a layer of aggregation that's finer than we are working at.

And the other thing that our work is not is it is not a political review. It is not a large-scale review of the political forces that may be destabilizing in the long term the DNS. That, again, we think that that should be in a risk management framework, but it's not our task to review that level.

And then, of course, we believe that our report is pretty thorough and balanced in the level at which it works, and we think it's a level at which the AoC reviews are mandated.

I'll repeat something I have said in previous presentations.

We took this work very seriously from the Affirmation of Commitments point of view. We realize that the Affirmation of Commitments changes the relationships between ICANN and everyone else in a very significant manner. It is not providing a checklist to the U.S. government, NTIA, for reviewing step by step what ICANN is doing. It's much bigger. It's a much higher responsibility, because that, the U.S. government can still do with our review and everything else. But it's now the GAC and everyone else in the community that is doing this review, or for whom we are providing this first input for the review.

And that is an extremely important step in the establishment and testing of the multistakeholder model.

So that gave us a mandate to be really careful, really deep and balanced and complete in our work. If we failed there, we will need it to be signaled particularly so that the review of reviews can take this into account.

The content of the results -- well, we have been displaying in the slides the timing and the history of the work.

If we move forward, we will have the recommendations. So as I said here, instead of going through all 28 recommendations, I will be -- not make a -- make a very brief description of our general findings, and

Simon McCalla will walk you through the structure of the document so it's easier to read.

Our main findings is that ICANN is generally performing reasonably in its mission of preserving and enhancing the stability, resilience and -- stability, security and resilience of the DNS.

There is room for improvement in many parts of this mission. It's not like there's -- here the statement has to be qualified. It's not like there's huge room for improvement, which means that would be a euphemism, polite way of saying a lot of things are wrong, and very wrong.

There are things that can be fixed, improved all over.

We didn't find any, you know, near crisis happening at the security, stability, and resiliency level.

We find improvements that can be made in documenting things, in deciding things, and in action.

Documentation has actually become more crisp as a result of our interaction with ICANN staff. That made it even more challenging to perform this review because it was after -- we were after a moving target. The adjustments that were being made to the mission statement, to the budget, to the planning and so forth were constant. And we're happy about that because that means we were really impinging on what we needed to.

ICANN needs to have a very good definition of what its stability, security, and resilience remit is. I personally think that questions of scope will always haunt ICANN. It will always be a moving target, as

well. But we find, together with ICANN staff and board members, that ICANN has, like, three spaces for its remit in stability, security, and resilience. One of them is the most inner core. It's the people who are on the payroll, the servers that are operated by ICANN itself; you know, ICANN operations which are within its hierarchical structure and its Board.

Then there's a second sphere which is where ICANN interacts with others, doesn't have a mandate upon them but has the ability to lead or cooperate closely. That will be the supporting organizations, advisory committees and their members.

And a third sphere which is everything else in the world to which ICANN is actually very loosely coupled. There you would have everybody who consults the DNS. People like ISPs who establish a DNS infrastructure, people who are interested in using the DNS creatively. People who are interested in attacking the Internet through the DNS or who have the DNS as a target itself, but over which ICANN doesn't have any mandate.

So those -- this third sphere has to be handled mostly through outreach and education to the community, and this cannot be done directly only by ICANN but also with leadership to many others who are providing information others need. And also very particularly and very pointedly, in risk management. It has to be considered the origin of risks, and ICANN is not, like, sitting idly there, but it's also not like you have a mandate over (indiscernible) and hackers that can actually tell them to stop bothering the DNS.

So that will basically be the information I would like to present and hand it over to Simon McCalla.

SIMON McCALLA:

Thank you.

So what I'd like to do, rather than run you through all 28 of our recommendations, we'll just very briefly give you an oversight into the structure of the report and then some of the key themes that will hopefully give you some insight into how we were thinking.

So firstly we looked at the mandate for the group, and we decided to split and write our report to reflect that mandate.

So the very first section of the report talks very much about ICANN's scope and its structure with respect to SSR.

What we found in our recommendations as we looked through that was that ICANN probably could do with helping to clarify its SSR remit. Make it simple and straightforward for the community to understand.

Use consistent terminology, using consistent wording and language when it talks about SSR, and to use that language to help define the nature of its SSR relationships. In a multistakeholder model, that's absolutely vital as it has to lean on the community to do its work. Understanding those relationships and making them really, really effective, we thought, would be the key to a really successful SSR mission.

So the first six recommendations really reflect those themes and reflect our desire for that to happen.

The second piece of the report, and probably the meat of the report, if you like, is around the effectiveness and the implementation of ICANN's SSR framework and activities. And there's quite a lot of detail in here. It

runs all the way from recommendation 7 right through to recommendation 22.

And here we looked at, firstly, how did ICANN define its objectives, how can did it measure against goals, how did the community and how can ICANN judge whether it's being successful in its SSR activities.

So we've called for some greater clarification around goals, greater clarification around the way the community can recognize whether ICANN is doing a great job with SSR or not.

We looked very much at the structure and the budget assigned to SSR activities. And one of the key findings we found, for example, was there is quite a lot of money spent. I think for FY11, something around 7 million pounds -- sorry, dollars, was spent on SSR activities. But actually tracking how that was being spent down through the organization was challenging. So again, clarity of structure, clarity of budget was really important, and that's reflected in the recommendations.

We looked at how ICANN could consider becoming a very process-driven organization. We looked at certifications, the ISO schemes and some of the other schemes there, and ITIL.

This isn't trying to find some kind of new certification for ICANN's unique activities. It's more about ICANN aligning it's processes with some of the more standard accreditations. So we thought that was really important.

We looked also, too, to outreach and the way ICANN uses its outreach mission to affect its SSR activities. And we noted that there were some excellent areas where that was being done very well but also some

areas where ICANN probably ought to consider sort of modifying its approach in order to make its outcome much more effective. Particularly as the community and the nature of the Internet changes, making sure that outreach is relevant to the various stakeholders. And a good example of that is DNSSEC, for example, where they have had really great success in the registry space, but the ISPs and some of the registrars have not really caught up. So how can we modify that approach to really make sure that everybody is being included in that.

And then we move on to Section 3. We took a look at very much -- this is more the future-gazing side of the report, so we looked at the way ICANN manages and understands threat and risk. And here we found again that clarity of the organization to allow ICANN to really understand how it assesses threats, how it assesses the threat landscape and how it looks at risk was really important. And we recognized actually there was no formal risk framework within ICANN that we could find. And we felt that would be absolutely vital, if you're looking to create an effective, forward-looking SSR plan that you understand the risks and the nature of the threats that are around you and have a way of measuring that and then aligning that to your SSR plans.

So a very key call at the back end of the report is for a proper, thorough risk management framework.

And so that wraps up, roughly, our 28 recommendations split across those three sections.

Alejandro, I don't know if there is anything would you like to add onto that.

CHAIR DRYDEN: Would you like to add, Alejandro?

ALEJANDRO PISANTY: No. I think we are set for questions and comments.

CHAIR DRYDEN: So I thank you very much for that introduction to your final report.

I note that there are a number of links to topics that we were discussing earlier today, in fact. We were discussing contracting and compliance and registrar accreditation and these kinds of issues, and I can see where you have recommendations that are also very much supporting the reports and issues being raised by the GAC and elsewhere in the community.

So with that, are there any questions or comments for the members of the review team?

Australia.

AUSTRALIA: Thank you, Chair. And thank you for the excellent overview of the work that you have been doing.

I had the honor of being the GAC chair's delegate to the WHOIS Review Team which was working much the same time, and interesting to hear many of the same themes resonating across reports.

I was noting sort of the budget transparency was a thing the WHOIS Review Team looked at as well. Clarity of purpose and clear documentation and so on were all themes that we looked at as well.

So hopefully those sort of themes will resonate with the community and the Board when looking at these two reports.

One thing in particular that the WHOIS Review Team spent a fair bit of time on was compliance, ICANN compliance activities and there was a clear -- to me a very clear link there in that there are some very clear WHOIS provisions and there were concerns about whether they were being enforced and so on.

The GAC has also been discussing and talking with the Board about ICANN's compliance function. And I would be interested if you could say a few words about the compliance from a security and stability point of view. It may be a perspective we have not considered but certainly I have not looked at in any detail.

ALEJANDRO PISANTY:

Very briefly, we considered compliance. Compliance was a very visible issue when we started to work. It was very hard and very controversial. So we certainly made sure that we looked at it. And we -- very briefly, our conclusion was that we agreed contract compliance was a very important factor for the stability of the organization. For the security and, say, for -- what's implied in security and stability is the certainty that things will work in a certain way, in a given, expected, prescribed way.

And we, therefore, back -- let's say from the security, stability, and resiliency point of view, we took back all the efforts that ICANN took. And we support even a step up in the efforts for contract compliance. We realize, again, that this is subject to a number of forces. There's occasions where compliance is perceived by some parties to be in conflict with other values. That should be, of course, taken into account. As you will see in the report, in all places -- in most places it's explicit in the report. And in others it should be, basically, implicit that we are always recommending that actions by ICANN are taken in the regular prescribed multistakeholder participative bottom-up way. So all values that could be perceived as in conflict with certain process for compliance are taken into account. But certainly contractual compliance is seen as an important contribution.

I will mention there also, as a derivative of what I already said, this was a very specific question by the GAC. And it was very clearly outlined in the AoC mandate for this review, which is procedural clarity, process clarity.

And we find that for the functions that we studied, ICANN has done a lot of work to have much more clarity of process. Things like you look at the policy development processes and the ways things are decided, the way budgets are consulted, the way that now the SSR framework itself is put out for consultation.

And we believe that those things have already a woodwork towards procedural clarity or clarity of process. And we support again everything that ICANN can do with the community as a whole to have

even clearer processes. That also hinges with your comment on budget and documentation clarity.

CHAIR DRYDEN: Thank you for that. Are there any others?

DAVID CAKE: David Cake from the SSR review team. Just another reply to the question from Australia.

Contract compliance includes escrow, which is an absolutely key resiliency requirement. We do identify that in the report..

CHAIR DRYDEN: Thank you, Singapore. Please.

SINGAPORE: Thank you, chair. First of all, thank you much for the SSR team for the very comprehensive recommendation you put forward. I'm just curious to find out whether -- in making all these recommendations, whether the review team has sort of indicated that an April time frame for implementing these recommendations at least for some recommendations which the review team may think is of some urgency. Is there any sort of indication from the review team about this time frame for implementation? Thank you.

SIMON McCALLA: I think we deliberately tried to step away from sort of defining any specific time frames for these recommendations. However, I think one of the key natures of the way we went about the review is we spent a lot of time liaising with the ICANN security team in order to make sure that the recommendations that we did put forward were implementable and were implementable in a way that they could be got on with and actioned very quickly. So I would hope that many of the recommendations you see here, once accepted by the board, we were able to see good and strong movement. I think it would be fair to say that one of the great things we've seen from the ICANN team has been - they've already been acting on some of the things in the draft report. We've seen consultation and we've documents published already that are reacting to this very report, in fact, the draft version of this report. So I think that shows a strong will and desire by the ICANN team to get on with some of the findings in that report. So I feel very strongly that they're going to be in a position where they're going to show great progress quite quickly.

CHAIR DRYDEN: United States and Argentina, please.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: Thank you. Let me join colleagues for thanking you for your present and, of course, for all of your hard work. We were quite taken by the number of recommendations that you developed, and they're all extremely helpful. But I guess, if I could follow Choon-Sai's sort of comment, if you had -- if you could choose a priority ranking of the recommendations, would you be able to do so? So that would be one

question. We'd be interested in getting your sense of what your priorities would be.

And then I guess I'm glad to hear you mention the fact that -- and you're saying it in a positive way, so I'm reassured by that -- that ICANN has already started to seek public comment. I confess we were a little bit confused as to, just from a process point of view, that your final report is still out for comment or is it final? Because we weren't sure about then ICANN posting a piece of that for comment. So I wasn't sure we understood the juxtaposition of the two. If you wouldn't mind shedding light on that. Thank you.

ALEJANDRO PISANTY:

Thank you. As my friend used to say, it has a certain treat to say thank you, U.S., in the multistakeholder model for an individual.

That aside, first your last question. The report is final. The version that you have is what we planned as the final version. ICANN has put it out for comment following clear process. If you -- I mean, this has just been out, so you have to absorb it. But the comment that is now requested by ICANN is directed to the board for implementation of our report. It's not like going back to the review team for us to redo any part, I mean, unless -- we will redo anything that's, you know, found wrong, counterfactual, et cetera. We will reconvene for that, of course, with lots of goodwill and open ears.

But the report is final and delivered to the board and the GAC and the community. The report that is requested by the process now is comment directed to the board to see ways to implement the report. I

think that gives you clarity on where the comments are still open. ICANN took the unprecedented step -- and we know it sounds confusing, but we finally are in more favor of it.

ICANN took the unprecedented step of sort of getting that some recommendations were going to be in the final report, like the ones about clarity of process and budgeting and so forth, and started a public consultation about those while the report was still in the draft stage, in the last few weeks before we delivered it as final. But you know, I guess the -- my guess about their guess is that these lines have not really changed very much over the 20-something draft versions. So they preferred to jump start that process early instead of waiting for the final report and its absorption by the board. So they gained about a year in a very valuable consultation. So, from the review team point of view, we're actually happy that this was done. We were supportive of this consultation. Although it was done on a draft version, it's a useful one and it didn't change. The text was really stable about the recommendations.

With your question -- now to your first question of priority, I will say that I always distinguish between -- this is personal. I always distinguish between priority and precedence. Do we have recommendations that we think are particularly important? Do we think the recommendations on which ICANN should start to work right away? I will distinguish between those two in the sense that, for example, working on the budget, working for the final consultations for SSR framework and so forth has started so early that it has already started. The timing for that is minus 6 months, and they started, which we're, as I said, supportive of.

As for priority, the most important task -- again, we didn't assign priorities in this sense because we thought, you know, it's more for the board and community now to do so. But, personally -- and I would say that there's a number of people in the review team who think the same. The most important task for ICANN is the one that's already started with the board working group, which is to establish a comprehensive risk framework for the DNS.

I will give you a bit more detail, because I think this will be -- this will help the GAC in its work, in particular, that we started hearing of a request from many in the community for ICANN to make a map of the threat landscape to the DNS.

We analyzed this and concluded that getting the threat landscape would only be part of the -- of what ICANN needs. Because you only get a list of threats and maybe some priority and urgency about them. But you don't get a consideration of the cost of responding to them, the timeliness or the time it takes to develop responses to the threats and how to articulate between those responses. So that's why we went from the threat landscape to a risk management framework. That's much more comprehensive. The other point of view about this -- and, again, this is more personal, but it is stated in the report -- is that this risk framework has to be comprehensive. But, on the other hand, we would urge the ICANN board working group to start with what they can and then build up the rest of the framework as time goes. It's so important and also significantly urgent that you cannot wait for having the complete thing which will -- you will never finish because it's a moving target.

So that's -- that should answer your question there.

Any other further comment from the team here?

CHAIR DRYDEN:

I have Argentina, Netherlands, and Italy.

ARGENTINA:

Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and to the team for the work and for the presentation. It's a comment and question. Being a university teacher apart from being advisor to the government of Argentina, I notice very few awareness in universities about everything that happens in ICANN. I am the only one that usually talks about it to my students and to other colleagues also, other teacher colleagues.

So my question was about the outreach activities that you mentioned. If you could explain them a little bit further and especially about Latin America, if you could given us some comments and if ask could be a liaison to bring your voice over there, that could be something at least for me. Thank you.

SIMON McCALLA:

To address your outreach comment, what we noticed was we took -- we tried to take a look at some other organizations that had gone through this kind of process themselves. And we noted the success of ISOC with its IP version S6, IPv6 day. What we found was really interesting about what they'd done was they'd gone beyond their original community to reach out to businesses such as Google and folks like that and to get them engaged and, as a result, had created a real momentum behind

World IPv6 day. And we thought we'd call that out specifically in the report and say this is a great example of how, if you take a look at a problem slightly different, sometimes you can make outreach activities much, much more effective. So what we looked at in the report is what outreach activities are going really well and what possibly could be considered needing to be changed. I think the trick here is very much looking at what it is you're trying to achieve and who are the right parties to reach out. And many cases reaching out through the existing ICANN community is the right way to do that. There will be cases where the Internet landscape changes where sometimes reaching beyond the ICANN community to a new community of people, whether that's in business or an academic community is absolutely the right way to push our outreach without significantly increasing the cost and the amount of people involved.

So we've not been specific or prescriptive about that. But we have recommended that ICANN take a look and make sure it's constantly evaluating is this still the right approach or do we need to look differently?

CHAIR DRYDEN:

Thank you. We have a comment to add?

ALEJANDRO PISANTY:

Yes. To complement what Simon said, there are a number -- we took into account very significantly in the report some of the outreach activities that ICANN is doing both, as Simon has mentioned, through the traditional ICANN community in combination with ISOC and other

conversations ccTLDs and many others, although they're part of the official community, they get into places where the official effort does not go and things that go around operational activities which are also enhancing the resilience of the DNS, which is, for example, setting up any copies of the root. Some of them are being done by other roots. Like the F-root is very active. But the -- ICANN's effort with the L-root has recently been stepped up. We see very favorably the plan there, which is to make sort of DNS in a box, as they call it colloquially inside ICANN, which is make a very low cost copy of the root, of the L-root that can be installed in very few days and a lot of good training gets done there. That also attracts honest goodwill from the people who get this benefit. It serves the Internet community locally, makes the DNS more resilient without increasing badly -- say least proportionately the overhead of managing it and the cost to ICANN community. We found that kind of activity very useful. For all we know, it does get done with collaboration with local communities, as I mentioned. Not only the ccTLD manager, for example, but also reaching out to the technical community in the country. And that will include in many places university people, because in many places these are the only ones who have both the knowledge and the interest. And maybe also some private ISPs. But they maybe wont, at the beginning, make the same level of effort as university instructors or professors or researchers to make a robust implementation.

And, finally, there's a number of efforts that exist for outreach about the DNS and ICANN matters like the one you chair with the SSIG, which we believe would go back and read the recommendations, you will see that there's a couple places where we recommend that every

component of ICANN or people who want to help ICANN, that's more colloquially, take into account the security and stability and resilience considerations and put them into their work.

CHAIR DRYDEN: Netherlands, please.

NETHERLANDS: Yes, thank you.

Just one question about I think in line I saw with U.S. comments. I had a little trouble of seeing the trees in the woods, as we say in Netherlands - - had a little trouble with seeing the trees in the wood as we say in the Netherlands because there are a lot of recommendations. I wonder if there's a kind of grouping which you can say. And also, of course, just as U.S. was very interested in seeing what are the real priorities there within these. And I can see that a lot of the recommendations are intended to have more transparency, to know that SSR is working on things, the framework, also the intention that other constituencies take are serious and what I can do for them. But I'm wondering if there's some kind of grouping and what do you consider as your priority? Thank you.

SIMON McCALLA: Certainly. I think, going back to some of what we said earlier, I think that it's -- you're absolutely right. For the first grouping I think -- and that goes right across the report that goes to clarity. And there's a

number of recommendations in here that are specifically calling for clarity around budget, clarity around process, clarity around people.

The second grouping I would suggest is around documentation, writing that down, and then using that. Once you define that clarity, it's using that to be more effective, whether that's in terms of how you manage finances, whether that's how ICANN manages relationships, or whether that's how ICANN manages the threat landscape. So that second layer, if you like, on top of that clarity is make sure you're using that and not trying to do things in an ad hoc manner.

And I think there's quite a significant chunk of recommendations about structure as well and about making sure you've got a very clear structure and how you're going to go about implementing some of these changes, whether it's through people, whether it's through process, or whether it's about sticking to a specific way of working and making sure that you've defined that well, measured it well, and can be -- the community can look in and see whether that has been successful. Because one of the things we found throughout our activities were -- it took us quite a while to understand how well things are actually working. It wasn't clear. There weren't clear measurable goals. It was difficult to find clear measurable objectives in a lot of the documentation and a lot of the activities. So I think that there's some very significant groupings there. And I think you see the themes coming through each of the three sections of the report, which is, again, the scope and structure, the effectiveness of implementation, and understanding that risk landscape. Those themes play throughout those sections, I think.

ALEJANDRO PISANTY:

To complement this, I think all members of the team have faced the elevator time report question. What's the report that you will give in 20 seconds, in a minute in an elevator? But it depends on who we're directing it to. It's a different set of priorities for the GAC, for the GNSO, for the board and so forth. And as I mentioned, most urgent tasks are clarity about the budgets and plans for the next year. You can take a lot of the language, as Simon has already mentioned. It's directly implementable. Take it into the next cycle of planning. Use the things that the community has already been doing to build a risk management framework as fast as possible, at least the core framework that you can start working with. And here we'd also like to mention the DSSA work, the work that has been identifying the threat landscape from the community collaboration, has been very valuable feedback. And we believe that the board can absorb that or the working group of the report should absorb that immediately. That will be you know, the clear-cut of what are the highlights at least for what we believe we interpret as the GAC's needs. And we'll, of course -- it supports GAC questions like compliance, RAA and so forth, which maybe weren't even as highlighted as they are now or compliance, for example, was a huge highlight. And now it has sort of gotten into the general conversations. We don't need to point that starkly to it because it's been -- not because we think it doesn't have to be done. It's very important. But it's already being managed in the dialogue.

CHAIR DRYDEN:

Thank you for that. I have two final requests to speak, and then we're running a bit late. So we will tie up this session. So I have Italy and U.K., please.

ITALY:

Okay. Thank you.

Few notes. First of all, it was clarified that this request for comment period is made by the board. And then, looking at the AoC, the board should be called to take some decision about accepting the recommendations by middle of December or, at the latest, I would say first meeting of next year. And this is quite important to think to take in mind of what we expect from the board and when to decide.

Then I want to say that what I see here -- and my compliments to the substance of this study. It is really outstanding, in my opinion -- is that in the past, the impression was that the board relied on two voluntary advisory groups, the security and stability committee and the root server system committee. And now what you're asking for is more complete planning is it taking much more direct responsibility from ICANN and improving the staff structure and invest in order to have more secure, let's say, decision-making well prepared by the staff. This is quite an important aspect to me and is the real change that I see here. Thank you.

CHAIR DRYDEN:

Thank you, Italy.

U.K., please.

UNITED KINGDOM:

Thanks very much, chair. And thanks very much for the summary overview of the review team's report. It's very helpful and a very important one. There's quite a lot of reassurance in it, of course, that

there's nothing fundamentally wrong in ICANN's approach to this critical issue.

And those recommendations that concern clarity and definition and clarification are well made, and I agree the implementation should now steam ahead.

And it's good to know that the risk management framework is already in hand. So that's all very good news.

There's going to be another review. With all these recommendations and all these actions quickly deployed, what do you think the next step would be for the next review? I mean, bearing in mind what's going to happen over the next two to three years, what -- if you could just give one or two pointers just quickly. I know we're running out of time. That would be very helpful, given that this is not a one off thing. The work that's been done here really does set things in order, sets the house in order, if you like. What's next? Thank you.

ALEJANDRO PISANTY:

Thank you. We thought a lot about that trying to make the report with the foresight that there will be a new review in three years. This is -- in many ways this is a baseline assessment with some forward-looking. The next one will have to be really an evaluation of how things have been changed, improved by absorbing whatever good is in this proposal.

In three years, I believe that ICANN has had -- as a consequence of this review, ICANN should have a comprehensive participatively built risk management framework. Have a clear process for updates, which

recognizes the need for some confidential information as well as some very open exchanges and that has good connection. That means a very interactive connection with sources of information and informed opinion for managing that risk management framework.

ICANN will have decided in three years what formal certifications are appropriate for its staff like, you know, it mentions here ITIL, ISOC 27000 and so forth.

ICANN should also have made it clear to the community that some of its processes are original enough or specific enough that it's a waste of time and effort to go and get those out.

There will be a lot of clarity about what ICANN is doing in SSR, whether it's doing it for its core function, whether it's doing it in interaction with contractive or actively -- structurally active parties or managing with the outer community.

The budget -- let's say, when you look at the budget in three years, you should not be uncertain about half of the security budget. But let's say 80% of the security budgets will be clearly accounted for. That will be my measure. We're not prescribing any figure. But let's say if it's 25 or 40% now that's clearly accounted for, that should be improved to about 80%. In any organization where any of the team members has worked, there's always some fuzziness about where you account for security functions. Is the doorman a security function? So, with that in mind, the percentage of budget covered by this analysis should be a much larger one. I think those would be the most notable parts. I don't know if Simon or others would like to add.

SIMON McCALLA:

Just briefly, I think very much this report is a foundation. It's the first review of the SSR activities. My view is that, by the time the next review team is standing in front of you with a final report on this subject, we'll have a new top-level domain program thoroughly under way. And they'll be able to assess the efficacy and also the effects on SSR of that. Hopefully, there will be strong a solid risk framework in place in which, again, that team will be able to assess how well that risk framework is really working, particularly in light of the new gTLD program. And I believe, if this report is implemented, that team will be reviewing how effective the SSR documented plans, goals, and objectives are being. And the ICANN will be into its second or maybe even third round of yearly reviews of goals and objectives around SSR. So I'm hoping in many ways they'll build upon this report, and we will see almost a part two of this report where we see how effective some of these measures really have been.

CHAIR DRYDEN:

Thank you very much for those additional clarifications. So thank you to all the members of the review team for coming to brief us today about the final report. And thank you for all the work that we know goes into working on these review teams on a voluntary basis. And it's a significant amount of work that you have carried out. So we do appreciate it here in the GAC, and I expect that we will want to continue discussing these issues after today, particularly, if there are ongoing comments about implementation of the recommendations being conducted on the board and so on. Then we hope to continue our efforts in the area of security, stability, and resiliency at ICANN. So many thanks for meeting with us.

SIMON McCALLA:

Thank you.

CHAIR DRYDEN:

For the GAC, we now have a domain name market briefing. So, if we can just remain as we are, please. And we'll move into the next session in a few seconds.